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ABSTRACT 
This communication focuses on a fundamental problem related to the recently introduced 
Reference-Dependent Regret Model (RDRM) [Kujawski, 2005] for deterministic multi-
criteria decision making.  In [Kujawski, 2005] it was asserted that the RDRM model satisfies 
three properties.  The first of these properties, referred to as the “independence of dominated 
alternatives”, seems to be an intuitive one.  According to this property, the RDRM model 
preserves the ranking of two alternatives Ai and Aj with ranking Ai  Af j when a new 
alternative dominated by Ai is introduced or an old alternative dominated by Aj is dropped.   
In this communication it is demonstrated algebraically and also by means of a numerical 
example that the RDRM model may fail to satisfy this property.  The implication is that 
when the concepts of regret and/or rejoicing are considered and defined in terms of all the 
available alternatives in accordance with the RDRM, adding or dropping a dominated 
alternative can change the ranking of the alternatives and violate the independence of 
dominated alternatives property. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Incorporating behavioral aspects, such as feelings of regret and rejoicing, into Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis (MCDA) has been an intriguing area.  Among all the emotions, regret is 
the one that has received most of the attention.  Savage [1951] first proposed the notion of 
regret more than 50 years ago.  Later on, Loomes and Sugden [1982] and also Bell [1982] 
simultaneously proposed the regret theory for rational decision-making under uncertainty.  In 
their regret theory (to be referred to as RT-B/LS), it is assumed that regret depends on the 
differences of the utilities of the chosen alternative and the forgone alternatives that were 
considered but were not chosen.  
Recently, Kujawski [2005] argued that a person’s level of regret often depends 
explicitly on the absolute values of the utilities of the chosen and forgone alternatives rather 
than simply the differences.  He proposed the Reference-Dependent Regret Model (RDRM) 
to account for this behavior.  More specifically, according to the RDRM the associated regret 
when choosing alternative Ai and forgoing alternative Aj under criterion Ck, denoted as R(uik, 
ujk), is given by 
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In Eq. (1), uik is the utility of alternative Ai for criterion Ck. The notation G(.) denotes the 
regret-building function.  It measures the level of regret referenced to the maximum possible 
utility normalized to 1.  The G-function used in the RDRM model is given as follows: 
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In Eq. (2), B and S are two parameters that depend on the regret attitude of the individual 
decision maker.  The total level of regret for choosing Ai from a set S of n (where n ≥ 2) 
alternatives with m criteria is given by 
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The final utility of alternative Ai given the set S, is calculated as follows:  
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In Eq. (4), the first term is the classical utility of alternative Ai and the second term is the 
anticipated regret for choosing alternative Ai.  Finally, the alternatives are ranked by their 
overall utilities.  
Furthermore, in [Kujawski, 2005], three properties were introduced which were 
argued to be necessary conditions that any effective MCDA model should satisfy.  The first 
property is termed the “independence of dominated alternatives.”  According to this property, 
if a model ranks two alternatives Ai and Aj as Ai f  Aj, then when adding a new alternative 
which is dominated by Ai or dropping an existing alternative which is dominated by Aj should 
preserve the initial ranking Ai  Af j.  This property appears to be intuitive and it was thought 
that it had been proved to hold for the RDRM model [Kujawski, 2005].  However, as 
illustrated and proved in the next section, the RDRM model does not always satisfy this 
property.  
2.  RANK REVERSAL WITH THE RDRM MODEL  
In this section, a randomly generated decision problem is used to illustrate how the RDRM 
model may fail to satisfy the property of independence of dominated alternatives stated in 
[Kujawski, 2005].  This is further investigated by analyzing the RDRM model algebraically.  
2.1  An example of rank reversal with the RDRM model  
This numerical example is defined for two alternatives with three decision criteria. The 
following matrix D represents the utilities of the two alternatives in terms of the three criteria 
while the row vector W represents the weights of the three criteria.  
 





     W = [0.4149  0.4816   0.1035] 
 
Furthermore, the two parameters used in the G-function are assumed to be B = 0.60 and S = 
4.00.  
When Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) are applied to compute the overall regret values associated 
for choosing each alternative and forgoing all the others the results are:  
 
U1 = P1 – R1 = 0.3853 - 0.0102 = 0.3802 
U2 = P2 – R2 = 0.4353 - 0.0836 = 0.3517. 
 
Where Pi is the classical utility value of alternative Ai, Ri is the overall regret value for 
choosing alternative Ai and forgoing all the other alternatives, and Ui is the final utility value 
of alternative Ai after incorporating the effect of regret.  Since U1 > U2, alternative A1 is 
ranked higher than A2; i.e., A1  Af 2. 
 Next, a new alternative A3 which is dominated by alternative A1 is introduced.  Please 
note that in this example it is a coincidence that A2 also dominates A3.  The new decision 
matrix is given by 
 
 













The weight vector W remains the same as before.  The same formulas are applied as before to 
rank the alternatives.  The results are  
 
 U1 = P1 – R1 = 0.3853 - 0.0051 =   0.3802. 
U2 = P2 – R2 = 0.4353 - 0.0418 =   0.3935. 
U3 = P3 – R3 = 0.1528 - 0.4224 = - 0.2696. 
 
Now U2 > U1, so A2  Af 1.  This result is different than the previous result of A1  Af 2.  A 
rank reversal has just occurred.  Thus, the RDRM model failed the property of independence 
of dominated alternatives.  
2.2  Mathematical Analysis  
This section investigates mathematically why the RDRM model does not always follow the 
first property.  Given a set S of n alternatives and m criteria, suppose that two alternatives, 
say alternatives Ai and Aj, are ranked as Ai  Af j.  As described previously, the RDRM utility 
for alternative Ai and Aj are calculated as follows:  
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Given that the two alternatives are ranked as , fi jA A
                                                              U U 0s si j− >                             (6) 
When introducing a new alternative Ak which is dominated by Ai, the value of iR ′  remains 
unchanged while the value of  jR ′  may increase if Ak dominates Aj in terms of one or more 
criteria.  Thus, in Eq. (5), the part ( )i jR R′ ′−  may become less than before.  Meanwhile, the 
number of alternatives in the set S is increased by 1.  Along with the above changes, if the 
original value of ( )i jR R′ ′− is positive, the term 1 (1 i j( ) )R Rn ′ ′−−  in Eq. (5) may become 
smaller than before.  Then the inequality in Eq. (4) still holds.  However, if the original value 
of ( i j )R R′ − ′ is negative, the term 1 (1( ) )i jR Rn ′ ′−−  may become larger than before.  The 
inequality relation in Eq. (6) can be reversed and hence the ranking between Ai and Aj may be 
altered.  This is how the RDRM model can fail to satisfy the property of independence of 
dominated alternatives.  
3.  ANOTHER WAY FOR MODELING REGRET  
It may be questioned whether there is a way to avoid the above situation of rank reversal.  
Quiggin [1994] describes the problem where manipulation of a set of the alternatives may 
yield irrational choices as the ranking of the alternatives might be “money pumped”; i.e., the 
ranking of the alternatives is influenced by the introduction of dominated or non-Pareto 
optimal alternatives.  In order to avoid being “money pumped”, Quiggin [1994] proposed 
that the measure of regret should satisfy a property called the Irrelevance of Statewise 
Dominated Alternatives (ISDA).  This property is similar to the independence of dominated 
alternatives property proposed in [Kujawski, 2005].  In order to satisfy the ISDA property, 
Quiggin [1994] proved that regret must be determined solely by the best attainable outcome 
in each state of the world or equivalently the best performance value of each decision 
criterion in MCDA problems.  This is in contrast with determining the regret associated with 
an alternative by considering the entire set of alternatives, like averaging the regret 
contributions that are formed when considering all available choice pairs.  When this idea is 
applied to the study of how to model regret in MCDA problems, the regret associated with 
 
choosing one alternative and forgoing all the other alternatives is determined only by 
comparing the chosen criteria values with the best criteria values.  Addition or deletion of 
dominated alternatives then cannot affect the regret levels of the other alternatives because 
the best criteria values will be the same as before under these changes.  
In order to keep the ISDA property, it seems reasonable that regret should be 
measured only by the best possible value under each criterion.  However, this may not make 
much sense as it is illustrated in the following hypothetical situation.  Suppose that the 
following are the scores achieved by four students in some exam:  
 
 Students  Scores 
A1    30      
A2    32       
A3     31      
A4    100  
     
In this example there is just one student who earned a high score (i.e., 100 points).  
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the student who earned only 30 points feels some 
but limited regret for not having achieved a higher score.  This reaction may be rationalized 
because his/her performance is not as bad when it is compared to that of most of the other 
students.  However, the same student may feel much stronger regret for scoring only 30 
points if the scores of these students were as follows:  
 
Students  Scores 
A1    30      
A2    98 
A3    97 
A4   100 
 
This is understandable because in the new hypothetical example he/she is the only student 
who has achieved a very low score. 
Therefore, intuitively in the previous example, it makes more sense to compute regret 
in terms of the entire set of alternatives.  Thus, the concepts of regret and rejoicing may be 
more realistically expressed in terms of the criteria values of the entire set of alternatives, as 
given by Eq. (3), than in terms of only the best criteria values.  However, on the other hand, 
if regret is computed by considering all the alternatives then adding or deleting a dominated 
alternative may alter the initial rankings and thus leaves the ranking of the alternatives open 
to manipulations like the “Money Pump”.  
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From the above discussion, one can see that if the concepts of regret and/or rejoicing are 
considered in the decision-making process and are defined in terms of all the available 
alternatives, the ranking of the alternatives when only the Pareto-optimal alternatives are 
used may be different than the ranking of the alternatives when some or all of the dominated 
alternatives are considered besides the Pareto-optimal ones.  Adding or deleting a dominated 
 
 alternative can change the ranking of any alternative because of the interdependence among 
them.  Thus the RDRM does not satisfy the property of independence of dominated 
alternative that is proposed in [Kujawski, 2005].  The following question is still left answered 
and deserves further research: Is the property of independence of dominated alternatives a 
necessary condition that any effective MCDA model should satisfy or should its universality 
be considered suspect? 
Problems with incorporating regret/rejoicing within the framework of classical utility 
are not unexpected because classical utility theory does not permit comparing differences in 
utility [Luce and Raiffa, 1957: 32].  The problem of formally modifying classical utility 
theory to incorporate rational psychological influences is challenging; but worth pursuing.  
An alternative approach proposed by Kujawski [2005] is to incorporate regret as an element 
of a cost-utility-regret analysis. 
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